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Results are preliminary and incomplete, work in progress. 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of overconfidence in explaining farmer crop insurance 
purchasing decisions. The authors hypothesize that overconfidence could influence the 
participation decision and test this hypothesis. The preliminary results indicate that 
farmers are overconfident; however, the relationship between overconfidence and the 
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Background and Motivation           
          Despite appealing benefits of crop insurance, farmers’ participation in the crop 
insurance program has been limited.  Recently, the participation rate increased to 60-70% 
in the Midwest after heavy government subsidies.  In general, farmers are still reluctant to 
insure.  Assuming risk-averse farmers, this reluctance to insure presents a problem.  The 
literature proposed several explanations to justify farmers’ behavior.  However, 
researchers in the field seemed to overlook subjective expectations of the producers.  This 
paper argues that these expectations and their correspondence to reality might be 
responsible for the lack of interest in the insurance.  For example, if the farmer’s 
subjective yield distribution differs from historic yield distribution, his valuation of the 
insurance might differ from actuarially fair price.  Thus, the subjective expectations merit 
careful analysis.  To conduct this analysis, this paper employs the concept of 
overconfidence.  Overconfidence is defined as an individual’s propensity to overestimate 
the precision of the subjective information.  It is argued that presence of overconfidence 
can be responsible for farmers’ reluctance to insure.             
        The purpose of this paper is to investigate the existence of overconfidence in the 
farmers’ risk perceptions and relate it to the various characteristics and to actual 
production history (APH) insurance purchasing behavior.  The study relies on the data 
from the Crop Yield Risk Survey (CYRS).  It uses actual producer history (APH) 
insurance as a proxy for the MPCI.  It utilizes two measures of overconfidence: 
miscalibration and the BTA effect.  This paper performs several procedures to 
accomplish the objective.  It assesses miscalibration by estimating a calibration function 
between subjective and objective distribution of yields.  It examines the presence and the   4
degree of the BTA effect by asking farmers to report their perceptions concerning the 
level and variability of their yields.  This paper assesses how the shape of the derived 
calibration functions and the BTA effect varies among users and non-users of insurance. 
It relates miscalibration and the BTA effect to the various individual and farm 
characteristics such as acreage, age, education, experience, and risk preference. 
           The data comes from survey which was mailed to 3 000 corn and soybean farmers 
in Illinois, Iowa, and Indiana.  Progressive Farmer, a company specializing in surveying 
farmers, has complied the list. Farmers with less than 100 acres were not included. To 
improve survey, 2 focus groups were held. In addition, University staff, and USDA ERS 
economist reviewed the survey and the survey was pretested before mailing.  The survey 
was accompanied by $3 honor check to be cashed upon completion of the survey.  The 
survey contained several sections, including demographic, business, risk attributes and 
perceptions (such as level and variability of crop yields, yield histories and yield 
subjective probability distributions).  Response rate for the survey was 29%, which 
exceeded the usual response rate of 15% (as indicated by Progressive Farmers).  
          Several audiences could benefit from the insights presented by this research.  The 
findings could be of interest to academia by illustrating an application of behavioral 
finance (BF) to current issues in agricultural finance.  The use of overconfidence to 
explain a low participation is the novelty because the application of BF to the issues in 
agricultural finance has been limited.  The findings may also benefit insurance companies 
and farmers.  By analyzing the bias in the light of various characteristics, this research 
may assist in identifying various groups with different insurance needs.  For example, if 
the research identifies that education level impacts overconfidence, then farmers’   5
education level might be used as a predictor of their purchasing decisions.  Knowing 
these groups will allow insurance companies to develop products tailored to each group, 
thus improving a product selling process.    
   Preliminary results suggest that farmers, on average, are overconfident.  Miscalibration 
decreases with education, high school graduates tend to be the most overconfident, and 
the university graduates tend to be the least miscalibrated.  The  BTA effect depends on 
the farm size, only 2% of large farms owners indicated that their mean yield is less than 
county average.   
 
Literature Review 
         The literature review consists of three parts.  The first part discusses 
overconfidence; the second part presents developments in the literature for crop 
insurance, and the third presents related research on flood and earthquake insurance.  The 
paper discusses related research on flood and earthquake insurance to justify inclusion of 
various individual characteristics of farmers.   
 Overconfidence  
        Biases in the decision making are an important part of behavioral finance. Perhaps, 
the most researched bias is overconfidence.  A dictionary of psychology in politics and 
social sciences labels the concept as the overconfidence effect and defines it: 
“Unwarranted belief in the correctness of one’s judgments or beliefs.”  In the behavioral 
finance literature, the overconfidence effect is termed simply overconfidence.  The paper 
utilizes behavioral finance terminology.     6
          Recently, overconfidence has received a considerable amount of the research 
attention in economics.  It is defined as a tendency to overestimate the precision of one’s 
information (Glaser and Weber, 2004).  According to the literature, this bias is present 
everywhere. Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2002) report that overconfidence has been 
noticed in almost all professions, from management to nursing.  Currently, the literature 
on overconfidence distinguishes between three types of overconfidence: miscalibration, 
optimism and the better than average effect (Glaser and Weber, 2004). 
            Lichtenstein et al. (1982) cited several papers on calibration and the elicitations of 
the confidence intervals for unknown quantities. They reported that individuals tend to 
provide tight intervals when asked to supply a probability distribution on the unknown 
quantity.  This tendency has been labeled miscalibration in the literature.  Most of the 
research studied miscalibration in two situations: 1) when individuals were asked to 
assess unknown quantity using fractile methods, and 2) when individuals were asked to 
answer a question and to provide a subjective probability of how certain they are in that 
their answer were correct (Lichtenstein et al. 1982).  In the first case, the subjective 
probability distribution elicited was found to be “too tight” (Lichtenstein et al. 1982).  In 
the second case, the subjective probability (supplied by individual) was almost always 
more than the actual probability of getting the answer right.  Also, the miscalibration was 
greater for difficult tasks (Lichtenstein et al. 1982).  
          Another component of overconfidence is better than average effect (BTA).  The 
BTA effect refers to the individual’s propensity to overestimate his/her skills (Gervais, 
Heaton, and Odean, 2002).  The classical example is presented by Svenson (1981) who 
found that 80% of drivers thought that they were better drivers than others.       7
           Optimism is defined by Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2002) as “the belief that 
future favorable events are more likely than they actually are.”  They cited several 
articles that illustrate the optimism and situations where it arises.  For example, managers 
believe that the results of the projects can be controlled and that the projects are less risky 
than they actually are. 
          The existing literature is not clear about the relationship between the various 
measures of overconfidence. Taylor and Brown (1998) suggested that these measures 
should be correlated, while Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2004) argued that the 
measures should not be correlated. Glaser and Weber (2004) assessed the correlation 
among these measures empirically and found that most of the measures are not 
correlated.  
            How is overconfidence measured?  In the empirical literature, overconfidence is 
measured directly and indirectly. Indirectly, a proxy for overconfidence is selected, the 
proxy is treated as dependent variable, and arguments are made concerning the 
relationship between overconfidence and independent variables (see for example Gervais 
S., Heaton J., Odean, 2002, Barber and Odean, 2001).  Independent variables are usually 
variables that illustrate the extent of the heterogeneity in the sample, such as sex, 
intelligence, age, etc.  The hypothesized relationships are measured empirically and 
results are examined.  However, there is a major problem with indirect measurement of 
overconfidence. The problem lies in the selection of the proxy for overconfidence. While 
the literature often provides valid arguments as to why, for example, trading frequency 
(turnover) is a valid variable for overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2001); the literature 
does not provide strong reasons why the turnover will be a proxy for only   8
overconfidence.  This somewhat weakens the empirical results of indirect measurements, 
because resulting statistical significance may be an indication of the relationship between 
the independent variable and some other dependent variable for which turnover is a valid 
proxy as well.              
             Direct measurement is less prone to this problem because it is designed to strictly 
measure overconfidence.  Directly, overconfidence is usually assessed by examining its 
components: miscalibration and the BTA effect (see for example Lichtenstein et al. 1982, 
Kovalchik et.al. 2003, Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 2002).  In the assessment of 
miscalibration, subjects are provided with list of questions, which they answer and state 
how confident they are that their answer is correct.  Their confidence levels are compared 
to the probability of getting the answer correct.  This is called the confidence interval 
method.  Another way of assessing miscalibration is by asking subjects to provide a 
subjective probability distribution for an unknown quantity.  The subjective distribution 
is then compared to the true, or historic, distribution. The BTA effect is determined by 
asking respondents a series of questions.  These questions are designed to elicit the 
respondents’ perception concerning their certain skill level in relation to some 
benchmark.  For example, Svenson (1981) asked subjects compare their driving skills to 
the skills of other drivers.  Then these perceptions were analyzed. 
           How reasonable is it to expect overconfidence among farmers?  The BTA effect 
and optimism are found in individuals in various occupations.   Their presence and 
degree do not appear to depend on the specific occupation. However the miscalibration is 
a different case.  The extent of miscalibration varies among professions.  Miscalibration 
is low when three conditions are satisfied: high predictability, repetitive simple tasks, and   9
clear and fast feedback (Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2002).  This is why meteorologists, 
bridge players, race track bettors, and handicapped people tend to be well calibrated.  On 
the other hand, managers making a capital investment will not be well calibrated because 
the feedback is slow and noisy (Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2002).  In terms of possible 
miscalibration, farming as a profession should be somewhere between weather 
forecasting and capital investment decisions.  Farming does not meet all the criteria listed 
by Gervais, Heaton, and Odean for a farmer to be well calibrated.  The predictability of 
harvest is low, and the yield is random.  While the feedback is available, it tends to be 
noisy and distant in time.  The weather and technology are responsible for most of the 
noise.  Also, while farming tasks are repetitive, changes in the crops, changes in the 
planting practices, etc, may alter the routine and distort feedback.  In addition, some of 
the decisions farmers make are complicated, which could further obscure learning and 
lead to overconfidence bias in the farmers’ judgments.   There is empirical evidence that 
suggest presence of overconfidence.  Eales et al. (1990) analyzed whether futures and 
options prices reflect the subjective distribution of market participants.  They found that 
most of times futures and options price reasonably approximate expected price.  
However, the implied volatilities tend to overestimate subjective estimates of the 
volatility.  They concluded that this overestimation indicated presence of overconfidence.    
          What are possible consequences of these biases?  Overconfidence could reduce the 
variability of the subjective probability distribution and possibly negatively skewed.  This 
will make the insurance rate appear overpriced to a farmer.  The BTA effect may cause a 
farmer to perceive himself as more skillful. This in turn may cause him to think that he 
does not need the insurance at all. Also, if a farmer is overly optimistic about the future,   10
he may think that a natural disaster will not happened, even if this is not confirmed by the 
past.  Because the insurance provides a protection against natural disaster, such thinking 
may cause a farmer to perceive the insurance as unnecessary.  Arguing about possible 
effects of overconfidence, Alba and Hutchinson (2000) noted that the existence of 
overconfidence “lowers vigilance toward risks of hazardous consumption, creates 
inappropriate expectations regarding the likelihood of engaging in successful 
preventative behavior…, or suppresses contingency planning.”  In crop insurance case, 
overconfidence could be responsible for the farmers’ unwillingness to participate in the 
insurance programs. 
                In agricultural economics, most of the related research concentrated on the 
validity and reliability of subjective data (for detailed overview see Nerlove and Bessler, 
2001).  Only a few references can be located that analyze the relationship between 
producers’ perceptions and insurance and the research remains limited in that area. Buzby 
et al. (1994) analyzed discrepancies between subjective and historical yield distributions 
for Kentucky farmers.  They found that a correspondence existed between the means of 
the two distributions, but farmers were inclined to overestimate their yield and 
underestimate their risk.  Pease et al. (1993) compared forecasts of crop yields with 
subjective estimates of the farmers.  They found that farmers expected yields to be 
greater than what forecasted models predicted. Sherrick (2002) found systematic 
discrepancies between actual and subjective beliefs based on the long-term historic 
weather data; he argued that these discrepancies may have serious consequences on 
insurance valuation.  Bessler (1980) analyzed whether the aggregated elicited yield 
probability distribution from individual farmers can be represented by corresponding   11
historical yield data.  He found that ARIMA representation of historical yield was a 
reasonable approximation for expected values of the subjective distribution, but it did not 
performed well for higher moments.  While all of the studies examined discrepancies 
between subjective and historical yield distributions, none of them attempted to view 
these differences in light of the characteristics of farms and their owners.  Also, no 
attempt seemed to be made to classify any deviations found and provide ways to correct 
these deviations.                  
 
Crop Insurance    
         Because reasons to participate in the program are varied and complex, different 
approaches have been undertaken in the literature to explain farmer unwillingness to 
purchase crop insurance.  Hoping to explain the farmers’ lack of interest in MPCI 
through demand for insurance, researchers turn to finding appropriate demand variables 
and testing demand models.  To date, extensive work has been done up to the date. 
Goodwin (1993), using Iowa county level corn data, analyzed demand for insurance and 
found that premia, past year yield, rental to tenancy ratio, land values, farm size, 
percentage of land in corporative farming, and the interaction term between premium and 
risk are significant variables that explain demand.  Coble et al. (1996) using Kansas farm 
level wheat data reported that significant variables are expected return to insurance, 
variance of expected return to insurance, expected market return, variance of expected 
market return, farm net worth, and wheat acres.  Smith and Baquet (1996) using a survey 
from Montana wheat growers studied demand for the MPCI insurance.  Using several 
models they found that yield variability, premium rates, presence of debt, and level of   12
education explain demand for MPCI.  Sherrick et al. (2004) used survey data from 
farmers in Illinois, Iowa, and Indiana, to determine variables that could describe demand 
for insurance.   They found that farm size, age, debt to asset ratio, tenure, yield, 
importance of risk management, and probability of receiving an indemnity significantly 
influence insurance purchase. Makki and Somwaru (2001) analyzed time series farm 
level data from Iowa farms to determine important variables in demand for crop 
insurance.  They found that insurance choice depends on risk proxies, cost of insurance, 
and premium subsidy.  
          Another approach evident in the research literature is to explain a lack of interest in 
MPCI by analyzing interactions between insurance and other risk management 
alternatives that are available to farmers (such as hedging, and self insurance).  The major 
argument is if a farmer has better alternatives than insurance he may not be interested in 
MPCI. This can explain lack of interest in MPCI. For example, Mahul and Wright (2003) 
analyzed interactions between hedging and revenue insurance and found that futures and 
crop yield insurance are complements but futures and crop revenue insurance are 
substitutes.  Coble et al. (2003) assessed relationships between various insurance design 
and options.  They found that yield insurance and forward pricing are compliments while 
revenue insurance and forward pricings are substitutes.  Mahul (2003) found that under 
imperfect estimators of yield and/or price, yield and revenue insurance cannot provide 
adequate coverage alone and so may include other risk management tools such as 
revenue options and futures and also combinations.  
         Another reason that is often mentioned as an explanation for farmer reluctance to 
purchase MPCI in the literature is the expectation of ad hoc government disaster relief   13
payments.  If a farmer expects the government to provide disaster payments then he/she 
will not purchase insurance.  Policy makers seem to understand this because numerous 
government reports assert that the provision of federal aid will decrease farmer 
participation (GAO PAD-80-39, GAO RCED-88-211, GAO RCED-89-63, GAO RCED-
89-211, GAO RCED-90-37).  Also, there is empirical evidence that confirms the point 
(van Asseldonk 2002) and arguments from researchers (Skees 1999, 2001).  While 
provision of disaster relief does undermine demand for insurance, this argument is 
somewhat weakened by increased farmer participation in later years.  If a farmer knows 
that the government will provide aid, farmer participation should decrease over time, yet 
this has not happened.  More research is needed in this area to be able to address this 
issue in detail.  
Flood and Earthquake Insurance 
           Important implications can be derived from studies conducted on other insurances, 
such as flood and earthquake insurance.  Kunreuther et al. (1978) provide an extensive 
assessment of factors that motivate individuals to purchase (or not to purchase) flood and 
earthquake insurance.  Using lab studies they concluded that individuals tend to treat low 
probability events (such as flood, or earthquake) as if these events have zero probability 
of occurrence.  Because humans face various important issues, they prioritize.  
Kunreuther et al. (1978) hypothesize that to be important for consideration, an event 
should exceed some probability threshold level (individual for each person).  Thus, low 
probability events often are not considered because they fail to exceed the threshold level.  
Kunreuther et al. (1978) consider two models, expected utility and sequential choice 
models, and conclude that expected utility is not an adequate model to explain insurance   14
purchasing decisions.  Kunreuther et al. (1978) also analyzes how various factors differ 
between insured and uninsured.  Using a willingness to pay approach, they found that 
27% of uninsured are willing to pay current premiums, but are unaware how much 
premiums are.  Also, the insured expect higher damages in the future.  The majority of 
insured reported higher probabilities of disaster.  Also the majority of insured 
experienced disaster in the past.  They displayed higher risk aversion than the uninsured 
and are more likely to adopt protective measures against floods.  Surprisingly, the 
majority of uninsured indicated no expectation of federal disaster aid, but the number 
decreases (from 75 to 61%) as the amount of damages increases.  Interpersonal 
communication turned out to be important factor; insured people are more likely to know 
someone who has purchased the policy, or have talked to somebody about purchasing 
insurance.  Socioecomic characteristics (such as income, education, etc) turned out to be 
significant.   
Theoretical Model  
           The model used here is adopted from Glaser and Weber (2004).  Consider a farmer 
who is trying to forecast a yield  y ~ for the next year.  Assume the yield is normally 
distributed ) , ( ~ ~ 2
~ ~ y y N y σ µ .  The farmer receives signal s ~  about  y ~ in the form 
e c y s ~ ~ ~ ⋅ + =  where  ) , 0 ( ~ ~ 2
~ e N e σ and ) , 0 [ ∞ ∈ c .  The signal contains a parameter c that 
indicates the degree of overconfidence. If c=1 the farmer is rational.  If 0<c<1 the farmer 
is variance overconfident.  If c>1 the farmer variance underconfident.  Following Glaser 
and Weber (2004) conditional mean and variance are derived (assuming that  y ~ and e ~ are 
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         It can be seen from equation 1 and 2 that the mean and the variance of the yield 
contain the parameter c.  The argument is made here that the magnitude of the parameter 
may determine the insurance purchasing decisions.  For example, overconfident 
producers will not purchase the insurance and underconfident producers will. To consider 
all possible combinations of the parameters with subsequent decisions, table 1 is 
constructed.  
  Proposed variables and their relationship 
             Several variables will be utilized to systematically analyze the presence of 
overconfidence.  These variables have been broken into two parts: individual and farm 
characteristics.  
Farm-Level Characteristics 
           In this section, the possible effects of various farm characteristics on 
overconfidence are analyzed.  Research has been conducted in the past analyzing 
overconfidence of the entrepreneurs and their decisions about a possible business failure 
and market entry (Camerer and Lavollo, 1999).  However, the analysis has not been 
extended to the firm characteristics.  The theory on overconfidence is generally silent 
about possible effects of the various business aspects on overconfidence.  This is because 
by definition, overconfidence is a characteristic that pertains to the individuals, and not to 
the companies.  However, it is reasonable to expect that certain farm characteristics will   16
affect risk perceptions of owners/individuals.  This is why several characteristics were 
included. 
           In this paper looks at the three aspects of the farm that could impact 
overconfidence.  These are the size of the farm, debt to asset ratio, and diversification.  
The paper includes these characteristics because each of them is likely to affect 
overconfidence.  For example, farmers of large, well-diversified farm are more likely to 
be overconfident.  To measure the impact of size on overconfidence, size intervals have 
been developed.  The farms have been assigned to the intervals according to their size. 
The relationship between size and overconfidence will be established empirically.          
            A level of diversification is likely to influence overconfidence.  The survey 
contained several questions designed to assess the level of the diversification.  Examples 
are percentage of sales from livestock, various crops grown, number of separate farm 
locations, and off-farm income.  The potential effect of the relationship between the 
miscalibration, BTA effect, and the diversification will be established empirically.    
           The impact of the risk exposure will be analyzed as well.  The exposure to risk is 
measured by farmers’ debt to asset values.  This analysis will allow assessing the possible 
effect of various levels of debt to asset ratio on overconfidence.   
  Individual Characteristics  
              The relationship between various individual characteristics and overconfidence 
has been studied extensively.  There is an empirical evidence that suggests 
overconfidence depends on gender (Biasis et al. 2004, Barber and Odean, 2001), age 
(Kovalchik et al. 2003), experience (Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 2002, Brozynski et al. 
2004) intelligence (Biasis et al. 2004), and risk aversion (Brozynski et al. 2004).  Four   17
individual characteristics have been identified: age, education, experience, and risk 
aversion.   
         The level of education is expected to influence overconfidence.  While no studies 
directly look at the level of education, several of them considered intelligence in their 
analysis.  Because it is reasonable to expect the intelligence to be correlated with a level 
of education, the results from these studies indicate a potential relationship between 
overconfidence and the level of education.  Biasis et.al. 2004 found no relationship 
between a proxy for overconfidence and intelligence.  Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 
(2002) argued that the intelligence and the BTA effect are positively correlated.      
          A degree of risk aversion is the next vital measure.  Surprisingly, current literature 
on overconfidence seems to ignore risk aversion and a possible conflict between 
overconfidence and risk aversion (Alba and Hutchinson 2000).  Overconfidence and risk 
aversion operate in opposite directions.    A negative relationship is expected between 
risk aversion and the BTA effect.  The relationship between the miscalibration and risk 
aversion is also expected to be negative.      
          The impact of experience on overconfidence is well researched.  However the 
findings are usually contradictory. For example, Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2002) 
reported that the managers with successful carriers are more likely to be overconfident.  
Brozynski et.al. (2004) found that the BTA effect increases with experience and the 
miscalibration decreases with the experience.  Heath and Tversky (1991) argued that the 
experts are more likely to be overconfident.  Locke and Mann (2001) provided evidence 
that the investors tend to be less overconfident as their experience increases.  It is 
possible that the past research measured different aspects of overconfidence.  Because   18
they are not necessarily correlated, it is reasonable for the results to contradict each other.  
It is reasonable to expect that as a farmer becomes more experienced his/her subjective 
yield distribution approaches the objective distribution.  So the incongruence between the 
subjective and the objective distribution should decrease as experience increases.  This 
should lead to the negative relationship between miscalibration and experience.  Also, as 
the experience increases, the BTA effect is likely to increase as well.    
           The relationship between overconfidence and age is not as well researched.  
Kovalchik et.al. (2003) compared overconfidence between two groups.  One group had 
an average age of 20 and another had an average age of 82.  They found that 
miscalibration is present in both categories, but older individuals tend to be slightly better 
calibrated.  Age is likely to be correlated with experience, so the relationship between 
overconfidence and age is expected to be similar to the relationship of overconfidence 
and experience.  To measure this effect, the farmers will be grouped into several 
categories, based on the appropriate age.   
 Methods  
        Measures  
           The survey allows us to assess two components of overconfidence: miscalibration 
and the BTA effect.  Due to the above mentioned problem with an indirect measurement 
of overconfidence (i.e. proxy specification), the miscalibration and the BTA effect were 
assessed directly.  To measure the miscalibration this paper elicited a subjective 
probability of yields.  The shape of the calibration function (thus the congruence between 
subjective and objective functions) will illustrate whether miscalibration is present.  To 
measure the BTA effect this paper asked questions related to the farmers yield   19
perceptions.  In particular, the farmers were asked to indicate whether their mean yield 
level is higher, same, or lower in comparison with the county average, and whether their 
yield variability level is greater, identical, or less variable in comparison to the county’s 
variability.  In essence, the BTA effect is decomposed in 2 parts: the mean BTA effect 
and the variability BTA effect.  In the absence of the BTA effect, it is reasonable to 
expect the majority of the farmers to view their yield mean and variability as being 
average. Besides the information on the measures of overconfidence, detailed personal 
information is available.  This will allow analyzing these two biases in terms of several 
farm and individual characteristics.          
Calibration  
             The calibration describes the correspondence between two different distributions.  
In statistical literature this method is known as a q-q plot (see for example Law and 
Kelton, 1991).  A detailed description of the calibration process can be found in Bunn 
(1984), Curtis et al. (1985). Curtis et al. (1985) notation is adopted here.  Consider the 
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          The distribution function FT(x) can be used to represent the variable X.  The 
calibration curve is the curve that relates FT(x) and ) (x Φ . It is a plot of  p x FT = ) (  
versus r x S = Φ ) ( , or more precisely, )) ( ( ) (
1 r F r p S T
− Φ = .  The resulting curve can be 
influenced by parameters of the distribution; in this case it is the standard deviation and 
mean of FT.  Several curves displayed in figure 1, reflect different possible shapes of the 
calibration curve.  Curve C reflects a perfectly calibrated subjective c.d.f., so  T µ =0, 
T S =1, and FT is normal.  The shape implies that the individual’s assessment of the 
objective distribution is completely correct.  Curve A illustrates the case when  T µ >0, and 
T S =1, where the assessor overestimated the mean, but correctly estimated the standard 
deviation.  Curve B shows the curve when  T µ =0 but  T S <1, where the assessor correctly 
predicted the mean, but underestimated the standard deviation.  Curve D illustrates the 
curve when  T µ =0 but  T S >1, where the assessor overestimated the standard deviation.  
Curve E shows the curve for the cases where  T µ <0, and  T S =1, the overestimated mean 
and the correctly estimated standard deviation. Also, it is possible to have both 
incorrectly estimated mean and variance.  Each of these cases is a representation of the 
miscalibrated assessment and an indication of the potential bias.  If overconfidence is 
present in farmer’s decision making, calibration curve should look like B in figure 2.  If 
no overconfidence is present then calibration curve should look like C.      
Data 
Survey description and parameterization of the crop distributions    21
            The study utilized a crop yield risk survey (CYRS).  The survey was conducted 
under a cooperative agreement with Economic Research Service USDA and supported by 
Risk Management Agency of USDA.  Copy of the survey is included in the appendix.  
Barry et al. (2002) provides following description of the survey: “Progressive Farmer – a 
company that communicates extensively with agricultural producers through farm 
magazines, surveys, and other means sold a comprehensive mailing list of farmers, 
together with selected demographic characteristics. The geographic scope of the survey 
included farmers in Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa. These states represent a relatively 
homogeneous portion of Midwestern U.S. agriculture, while still providing significant 
diversity in soil quality, levels and variability of crop yields, and crop and livestock 
enterprises. Progressive Farmer used random sampling of farms with at least 100 acres 
for the three state regions to compile a mailing list of 3000 farms.  Their anticipated rate 
was in the 15-20% range.  The 3000 total was selected together with the anticipated 
response rate, to yield a statistically reliable database for subsequent analysis.  As a part 
of survey development process, two focus groups of farmers were held in December 2000 
to provide information for survey formulation. The survey was also reviewed by other 
University personnel and economist with Economic Research Service of USDA.  It was 
then pretested with asset of farmers and a crop insurance agent.  The extensive and 
informative feedback from these activities contributed importantly to financing the 
content of the survey.  The survey was mailed in early March, 2001 with a request for 
farmers to return the completed questionnaire within a 10-day period.  A cover letter 
accompanying the survey explained the purpose, ensured confidentiality, provided 
directions for survey completion, and identified a source for inquiries if questions arose.    22
Included in the survey was an honor payment check for $3.00 which was to be cashed 
only upon completion and return of the survey.  A second mailing of the survey occurred 
three weeks later to stimulate further responses. 
        The survey form contains several sections, including demographic and business 
information, risk management information, risk attributes and perceptions, the conjoint 
ranking of insurance products and attributes, and related information (see the complete 
survey form in Appendix). The questions are a mixture of Likert rankings, fill-in-the-
blank, and box-checking.  Some open-ended questions are provided at the end of the 
survey form.    
         Demographic and business characteristics addressed in the survey included state 
and county location, farm size, tenure position, enterprise combinations, age and 
experience, education, business organization, off-farm income and financial structure.  
The risk management section sought to determine the farmers’ use and importance 
associated with asset of risk management options in marketing, insurance, financing, and 
production.  Degrees of familiarity and anticipated use of various crop insurance products 
were indicated.  Similarly, the farms rated the importance of various sources of 
information about crop insurance.  The survey section on risk attributes and perceptions 
addressed information about farmers’ levels and variability of crop yields, yield histories, 
and subjective probability distributions for corn and soybean yields. The conjoint section 
of the survey elicited farmers’ preferences fore eight separate combinations of insurance 
product attributes. Other survey questions addressed the farmers’ responses to additional 
insurance characteristics, and sought open ended responses about insurance premia 
improvements in crop insurance programs, and other comments and observations.   23
         A total of 926 surveys were returned. Of these, 896 were deemed sufficiently 
complete to be usable, resulting in an overall usable response rate of approximately 29%.  
In general, the survey rate was well above the anticipated total response rate of 15% to 
20%.”     
              One of the reviewers in the earlier revisions of draft raised legitimate concern 
regarding potential sample selection bias citing survey’s response rate.  To assess the 
degree of the bias it was suggested to compare other than yield sample variables (such as 
age, education) to state averages.  Table 2 compares age and education of survey data to 
state averages.  It indicates that farmers in the sample are more educated and older.  The 
fact that farmers in the sample differ from underlying population suggests presence of the 
sample selection bias.  The severity of the bias and possible ways to correct for it will be 
subject of future research.    
           Part of the survey was designed to elicit a subjective probability distribution for 
the crop.  The conviction weights approach was utilized (Cramer and Norris 1994) to 
elicit the subjective probability distribution.  This approach asks the respondent to assign 
probabilities to the intervals specified for the variable of interest.  Using these 
probabilities, both the cumulative and the probability functions can be constructed.  The 
survey also contained internal checks to insure that subjects are consistent in their 
reporting of the probabilities.  For example, the survey later contained two questions, 
each asking to supply the best estimate of getting an indemnity under 50% and 85% of 
APH for each crop.  
            Yields were approximated by Weibull distribution.  Sherrick et.al. (2004) 
suggested several useful properties of the Weibull distribution for modeling crop yields   24
including its non-symmetry, zero limit, and wide range of skewness and kurtosis.  The 
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            The parameters for each farmer’s subjective distribution were estimated assuming 
the Weibull distribution using nonlinear least squares between implied and tabulated 
response quantiles.  The parameters were calculated in Excel. 
           A similar procedure was performed to obtain historic (objective) yield 
distributions.  The yield levels for each county were obtained from NASS for the period 
ranging from 1972 to 2002.  The yields were detrended using a simple linear time trend.  
The simple linear trend was used because past research has indicated that yield data are 
stationary (i.e. do not contain unit root) (Sherrick et.al. 2004).  The detrended average 
mean and standard deviation were obtained for each county from the detrended yields.  
The estimates were then transformed to the farm level.  The farm yield levels are on 
average 1.4 times more variable than county levels. This multiplier was used in 
transforming county yield data.  The parameters for the objective Weibull distribution 
were estimated using maximum likelihood.  Excel Solver was utilized for this procedure 
as well.  Also, while calibration can be done non-parametrically, this paper utilizes 
parametric calibration.  This is because the distribution was assessed in intervals, so to 
construct entire distribution a parametric approach was needed.    
Characteristics of Data   25
          Tables 3 and 4 present basic statistics for the data.  The majority of responses came 
from Iowa and Illinois.  The mean for an average size farm is 757.  The major crops are 
corn and soybeans.  An average farmer is 54 years old and has been farming for 31 years.  
The majority of the farms carry debt.  Table 4 shows perceptions of average yield and its 
variability.  These perceptions are utilized for the BTA effect assessment.  In line of 
behavioral finance findings, the table demonstrates the existence of the BTA effect, 
because only 6-7% of farmers admit that their yields are lower than their county average, 
and only 14-15% admit that their yields are more risky than the county average.  Table 5 
illustrates what risk management options farmers employ and their importance.  Most of 
them view government programs, seed varieties, and financial savings as major risk 
management tools.  Crop insurance ranks only 7
th and 8
th in terms of its importance and 
use.   
 
Preliminary Results and Conclusion 
         This section presents and discusses results.  Results are for Illinois, sample size is 
224, and the sample includes only corn growers.  The section presents selected tables.  
The tables for the remaining variables specified in the analytical model (such as age, 
diversification, etc) are not included because they were inconclusive and statistically 
insignificant.  To assess significance between the relationships a chi squared test is 
conducted.  If results are significant the significance noted below the table.  Because the 
results shown are only for Illinois and only for the corn producers, the analysis is 
incomplete.  Thus, because the results are incomplete, the findings should be treated with 
caution.     26
         Table 6 presents the total number of overconfident and underconfident farmers.  In 
general, farmers are overconfident; 62% displayed overconfidence.  Table 7 presents the 
relationship between farm size and miscalibration.  The table displays no relationship 
between miscalibration and overconfidence; the proportions are not significantly 
different.  Table 8 shows the relationship between the mean BTA effect and the size of 
the farm.   There is positive and statistically significant relationship between the mean 
BTA effect and size of the farm.  Table 9 shows the relationship between the variability 
BTA effect and size of the farm.  The results are significant, but the relationship is 
inconclusive.  It seems that below average variability decreases with farm size.   
          Table 10 presents the relationship between education and miscalibration.  The 
proportion of overconfident farmers decreases as schooling increases.  Schooling has 
negative and statistically significant impact on the miscalibration.  Table 11 shows the 
relationship between the mean BTA effect and the level of education.  The above average 
mean proportion is the highest for the college educated and the lowest for the high school 
graduates.  Table 12 displays the relationship between the variability BTA effect and 
education.  The relationship is inconclusive.   
           In general, the relationship between miscalibration and experience is inconclusive.  
The relationship between the mean BTA effect and experience is positive, but the results 
are statistically insignificant.  The relationship between the variability BTA effect and 
experience is negative; the results are insignificant as well.   
            The relationship between the use of insurance and miscalibration does not show 
the hypothesized relationship, i.e. the proportions between users and non users are the 
same.  The relationship between the mean and the variability BTA effect does not   27
confirm the theory as well.   There seems no relationship between use of insurance and 
overconfidence.  However, the results are statistically insignificant.     
          Because the results are incomplete it is too early to draw conclusions.  In the near 
future, this paper planes to extend analysis to other states.  In addition, this paper planes 
to employ discrete regression model to assess the significance and the direction 
(measured by sign of the coefficient) of the relationship between the components of 
overconfidence and various characteristics of the farms and their owners.  Also, to further 
enrich the analysis the premia for the insurance will be calculated utilizing subjective 
yield distributions.  It is expected that overconfident farmers will be willing to pay less 
for the insurance.  As this paper addes more data from other states, and employ other 
statistical tools, a clearer picture should emerge about the nature and extent of 














Table 1. Insurance purchase decisions 
Overconfidence Purchasing  Decision 
c = 0  No purchase 
0< c <1  No purchase 
c = 1  Purchase  
c > 1  Purchase 
 
Table 2.  Comparison between survey data and ARMS survey.   
   Survey Data
ARMS Data (1996, Heartland 
Region, Corn Producers)
Education 
High School    45% 56%
Some College    27% 28%
College Graduate or Higher    28% 16%
    
Age 
Less than 50  40% 51%
50-64   25% 32%
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Table 3.  Farmer Characteristics     
               Percent or  Std. 
            Units  Average  Dev. 
Farms located in         
 Iowa    farms  411   
 Indiana    farms  117   
 Illinois    farms  342   
          
Tillable acres      acres  757 940 
          
Percent of farmland in:         
 Corn    percent  acres  49.22% 11.70% 
 Soybeans    percent  acres  44.23% 12.47% 
 Wheat    percent  acres  1.73% 5.48% 
 Other    percent  acres  4.82% 13.63% 
          
No. of separate farm locations  number  4.76 4.63 
          
No. of years farming    years  31 13 
Age (as of 1/1/2001)     years  54 13 
          
          
Highest formal education         
 High  School   farmers  360  
 Some  College   farmers  217  
 College  Graduate   farmers  192  
 Graduate  School   farmers  38  
 No  response   farmers  65  
          
Farms with farm debt    farmers  554  
          
Debt-to-asset ratio         
  0 to .20      farmers  249  
  .21 to .40      farmers  208  
  .41 to .60      farmers  102  
  .61 to .80      farmers              24   
   .81 and higher     farmers  4  
 
Table 4. Risk Attitudes and Perceptions     
            --  responses -- 
1.  Perceptions of ave. yield    corn soybeans 
 Higher yield than county average  487 443
 Lower yield than county average  54 57
About the same yield as county average  290 303
       
2.  Perception of yield riskiness       
 More stable than county average  375 360
 More variable than county average  127 119
 Same variability as county   328          330 
   30
Table 5.  Use and Importance of Risk Management Options 
            Farms using  Average  
              Score 
j Government  programs  173  5.98 
I  Multiple seed varieties  324  5.34 
g Financial  savings/reserves  281  5.19 
h  Spread crop sales over time  274  5.18 
n Forward  contracting  141  4.84 
b Multiple  crop  enterprises  227  4.80 
d  Crop revenue insurance  272  4.69 
c  Crop yield insurance  425  4.45 
f  Crop share leases  446  4.41 
k  Farm in multiple locations  536  4.32 
l Production/marketing contracts  327  4.07 
m  Back-up credit lines  157  3.88 
a Hedging/options  94  3.68 
e Catastrophic  insurance  (CAT)  333  3.30 
o Irrigation      28  2.23 
 
Table 6. Number of overconfident and underconfident farmers 
   Number of Farmers  Percentage
Variance Overconfidence   139 62%
Variance Underconfidence  85 38%
 
Table 7. Relationship between miscalibration and size of the farm         
 Large  Farms  Intermediate Farms   Small Farms  
Variance Overconfidence   61% 56% 61% 
Variance Underconfidence   39% 44% 39% 
 
Table 8. Relationship between BTA effect and size of the farm 
  Large Farms   Intermediate Farms   Small Farms  
Above Average Mean  77% 52% 55% 
Below Average Mean  2% 12% 11% 
Average Mean  21% 36% 34% 
Results are significant at 1% level 
 
Table 9. Relationship between BTA effect and size of the farm 
  Large Farms   Intermediate Farms  Small Farms  
Above Average Variability  47% 46% 52% 
Below Average Variability  10% 19% 15% 
Average Variability  43% 36% 34% 
Results are significant at 5% level 
 




College   College  
Graduate 
Degree  
Variance Overconfidence   71% 64% 48% 50%
Variance Underconfidence   29% 36% 52% 50%
Results are significant at 5% level  
   31




College   College  
Graduate 
Degree  
Above Average Mean  58% 59% 71% 64%
Below Average Mean  10% 5 % 13% 0%
Average Mean  33% 36% 15% 36%
 




College   College  
Graduate 
Degree  
Above Average Variability  45% 52% 52% 36%
Below Average Variability  14% 20% 8% 14%
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